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Abstract 
Insurance intermediaries help consumers to economize on information and transaction costs in 
insurance markets. However, competing insurance intermediaries provide heterogeneous 
services, which are difficult to assess by incompletely informed consumers. Transaction costs 
economics, search theory and principal agent theory provide arguments on product quality 
differences between the two main distribution channels in insurance markets (exclusive agents vs. 
independent intermediaries). The present paper uses a sample of 927 insurance intermediaries in 
Germany. By performing OLS estimations we test the impact of the different distribution 
channels, but also of other factors relating to the information processing activities on 
intermediaries’ service quality. Depending on the proxies used for service quality, we find mixed 
evidence for the “product quality” hypothesis according to which independent intermediaries 
provide better service quality than exclusive agents. We find that service quality depends also to 
a large extent on the information gathering and processing activities of the individual 
intermediaries.  
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The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services – Empirical Evidence for Germany  
1. Introduction  
There are profound information asymmetries between consumers and insurance companies in 
insurance markets. A number of institutions have evolved to mediate between consumers and 
insurance companies. In particular insurance intermediaries, like exclusive agents or insurance 
brokers, help to ease coordination and to further market transactions. They take an important 
position as match-makers between the supply and demand sides on insurance markets. On the one 
hand, they provide distribution and marketing services for insurance companies. On the other 
hand, they supply informational and advisory services for consumers. Insurance intermediaries 
assist in concluding an insurance contract by economizing on information and transaction costs. 
They provide low cost information to consumers about their risk profiles, insurance needs and 
suitable insurance products, thus reducing complexity for consumers.  
However, while insurance intermediaries contribute to enhancing transparency in insurance 
markets, the market for insurance intermediaries is itself characterized by information lags. 
Consumers act under incomplete and asymmetric information about the quality of the 
information and advisory services provided by insurance intermediaries. These services are itself 
experience and credence goods. A consumer cannot assess the service quality provided by 
competing insurance intermediaries in advance, but only after information and advice have been 
“consumed”. However, even this is often barely possible. Especially for long-term insurance 
products like old-age or disability insurance, the quality of the information and advice given can 
be evaluated only after the insured risk has actually occurred – which often takes place decades 
later. Common business practices that have evolved over time add to the lack of transparency. 
This holds true in particular for remuneration practices and disclosure requirements about 
business relations between intermediaries and insurance companies. Consequently, consumers 
have only very restricted information about potential conflicts of interest and potential bias in the 
information and advice given by insurance intermediaries.  
That insurance intermediaries indeed use these asymmetries to provide misleading and 
incomplete information to the detriments of consumers has been experienced in the UK in the 
1990s on a wide scale (Davis 2004). In 1997 the British government started to pay billions of 
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British pounds to compensate millions of employees who had opted out of occupational pension 
schemes because of bad advice given by financial intermediaries.  
Private insurance against the risks of longevity, illness or disability becomes more important also 
in countries with rather comprehensive social security systems because of the demographic 
changes ahead and because of financial pressure to reduce social security costs which arise from 
globalization. In addition, the introduction of a common insurance market in the EU in 1994 has 
led to fundamental changes in national insurance markets. By applying a liberal approach in 
regulating the insurance industry, countries like Germany or France introduced extensive 
deregulations in their formerly strictly regulated insurance markets. Although there are still no 
truly integrated EU-wide insurance markets, there is, nevertheless, more competition within the 
individual markets both with respect to prices and to product differentiation. Increasing product 
heterogeneity has two conflicting effects. On the one hand, it allows consumers to find products, 
which better match their preferences, thus increasing consumer welfare. On the other hand, it 
reduces market transparency, which may allow insurance companies to realize monopolistic 
profits. In this respect it decreases consumer welfare. Thus, taken together insurance 
intermediaries have become more important.  
In this paper we try to shed some more light on the question of the service quality provided by 
insurance intermediaries. It is based on a sample of 927 German exclusive agents, independent 
agents and insurance brokers, which was carried out in 2001.  
Insurance companies use multiple distribution channels to sell their products. The most important 
ones are exclusive agents, independent agents, insurance brokers and – for some years now – 
banks which also started to distribute insurance products. In Germany, direct purchasing through 
the internet also shows a growing, but still relative small share in selling insurance. While 
exclusive agents accounted for (estimated) 80% market share in 1985, they realized a rather 
strong decline to 27% in 2005 in the German market for personal insurance (Towers Perrin 
2007). In contrast to that, insurance brokers, who accounted for only 14% in 1985, increased their 
share to nearly 33% in 2005. Banks which had a negligible segment twenty years ago raised their 
share to nearly 25% in 2005. It is estimated that exclusive agents will be further under pressure, 
with independent agents, insurance brokers and bank assurance still gaining market shares. All in 
all, there is a tendency among insurance companies to follow a multi-channel instead of a single 
channel distribution strategy (Trigo Gamarra 2007a).  
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Given the above mentioned changes on the demand-side and in market regulation, the declining 
relevance of exclusive agents in Germany seems to indicate that other intermediaries are better 
able to meet consumers’ demand for information and related services when buying insurance. 
These empirical findings also touch the still controversial issue in the insurance literature about 
the coexistence of multiple distribution systems. There is an extensive discussion on whether 
exclusive agents and independent intermediaries provide fundamentally the same service quality 
or not. According to the market failure hypothesis their coexistence is a consequence of 
incomplete and asymmetric information in the insurance intermediary market, which allows the 
relatively more costly independent intermediaries to survive. On the opposite, the product quality 
hypothesis states that independent intermediaries provide better product quality than exclusive 
agents so that a separating equilibrium is realized. 
We add to the existing literature on the service quality provided by different distribution channels 
in a number of ways. Most empirical studies so far concern the property-liability insurance 
business in the US. Our data instead focus on the German market with personal lines, where old-
age provisions are of utmost importance. Besides, we explicitly use data from a survey among 
insurance intermediaries to account for differences on the service quality provided, while most of 
the empirical literature focuses on insurance companies that use different distribution channels. 
By this we provide some insights on other factors that explain quality differences between 
intermediaries despite them belonging to a certain distribution channel. Finally, we use a different 
approach in how to measure the service quality provided by intermediaries. In this way we 
contribute to the literature on empirically testing for service quality in insurance intermediary 
markets.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss in more detail the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature and derive our main hypotheses. In section 3 we describe the German 
market for insurance intermediation, our data and the estimation methods used. The estimation 
results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
In the following we give an overview of the relevant literature which deals with the service 
quality provided by insurance intermediaries. Based on a review of the main theoretical 
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arguments and empirical findings, which employ transaction cost economics, search theory and 
principal-agent theory, we formulate four main hypotheses.  
Theoretical Insights on Insurance Intermediaries’ Service Quality 
Insurance markets are characterized by incomplete and asymmetric information between 
insurance companies and consumers (Cummins/ Doherty 2006; Eckardt 2007). Due to the 
complexity of insurance coverage consumers need information about their risks, insurance 
product and contract design as well as about claims settlement, investment behavior and financial 
stability of insurance companies. Because of the long-term nature of most personal insurance, 
information must be gathered, processed and assessed repeatedly. This requires special skills and 
expert knowledge in many different areas, like insurance mathematics or contract law. Moreover, 
in order for the whole transaction to take place, other activities beyond information search must 
be carried out. Bargaining and administrative activities, which arise whenever the terms of the 
insurance contract are (re-)negotiated and/or loss settlement takes place, are the most important 
ones. Like information acquisition and assessment, these activities also require special knowledge 
and skills. Thus, they cause costs for the necessary investment and for the time spent in carrying 
them out. Taken together these costs add up to total transaction costs. On the other side, insurance 
companies also need information about consumers’ characteristics and behavior to provide 
adequate risk coverage. These activities can be performed either personally or with the help of 
intermediaries, who are specialized in providing such informational, bargaining and 
administrative services. Generally, consumers and insurance companies will turn to 
intermediaries whenever intermediated exchange creates greater net gains from trade than direct 
exchange (Spulber 1999, 256–286). Intermediaries can realize such higher net gains by reducing 
transaction costs. 
Transaction cost theory and search theory show that intermediaries help to economize on 
information and search costs and also provide additional services so that total transaction costs 
decline. Thus, they explain the existence of markets for insurance intermediaries. Reasons for 
lower transaction costs of intermediated exchange are (1) coordination cost savings and positive 
network externalities, (2) absolute cost advantages because of division of labor, specialization 
and learning effects over time as well as (3) economies of scale and scope with respect to the 
fixed costs of a transaction (Rose 1999, 58–66; Spulber 1999, 262–266). Coordination costs are 
lower in intermediated than in direct exchange since the number of contacts between potential 
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trading partners is reduced. By involving an intermediary, the number of marketing channels is 
reduced due to the fixed costs associated with coordinating potential trading partners. This leads 
to further cost reductions because of the increasing returns realized. Above that, there are also 
positive network externalities if the intermediary acts as a communication center (Baligh-
Richartz effect, Rose 1999, 60). Besides, transaction cost reductions result from higher 
productivity as a consequence of specialization and division of labor, learning effects over time 
and economies of scale and scope. Whereas in direct exchange consumers perform the activities 
related to the insurance transaction only for this particular transaction, intermediaries in insurance 
markets perform these activities more frequently and for a higher volume of transactions. In this 
manner gains can be realized by assisting in searching and matching, negotiating, monitoring, 
and executing insurance transactions. While a single consumer uses investment in human capital, 
search technologies or expertise to increase the productivity of transactional activities only for the 
transaction at hand, an intermediary can repeatedly use the same information. In this way, 
economies of scale and scope are obtained. All in all, intermediaries in insurance markets can 
improve market transparency between the two market sides at lower costs than under direct 
exchange (see Table 1). 
Table 1  Transaction Cost Reductions from Intermediation 
Transaction Stages Intermediary Service Cost Reduction  
Searching and matching • direct sales of information 
• matchmaking 
• market-making 
• search costs 
• information costs 
• opportunity costs of time 
Availability of products 
and immediacy 
• compensation of variances in demand and 
supply 
• opportunity costs of time 
Negotiating and  
Contracting 
• strong bargaining position 
• exploitation of differences in contract terms 
between supply and demand market side 
• to standardize contracts 
• negotiation costs 
• information costs 
• administrative costs 
• opportunity costs of time 
Monitoring and  
Guaranteeing 
• expertise in determining product and 
service quality 
• cross-sectional and temporal reuse of 
information 
• guaranteeing high product quality 
• information costs 
• monitoring and control costs 
• costs resulting from uncertainty 
• investment in expertise 
 
Source: Following Rose (1999, 65, Table 6). 
From search theory a number of factors that affect the service quality provided by insurance 
intermediaries can be identified (Posey/ Yavas 1995; Posey/ Tennyson 1998; Seog 1999, 2005; 
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Eckardt 2007). On the demand side, consumers’ preferences in regard to insurance related 
information and other transaction services and their transaction costs influence their make-or-buy 
decision. Besides, many information services depend on privately held information by 
consumers. Thus intermediation service quality depends also on the collaboration between 
consumers and intermediaries. On the supply side, the distribution of the relevant information as 
well as the search technology used are important factors that affect the search costs which have to 
be incurred for producing information and other services of a certain quality level (Rose 1999; 
Eckardt 2007). Most important inputs are the time spent for searching, processing and evaluating 
information and investment in specific insurance-related human capital (knowledge and skills).  
Insurance intermediaries differ by their legal status. Exclusive insurance agents represent 
exclusively the products of a single insurance company, whereas joint or independent insurance 
agents sell policies of different insurance companies, but normally for each line of insurance only 
from one insurance company. Opposed to the latter, insurance brokers are independent from 
insurance companies and principally distribute all insurance products available on the market. In 
the US, independent agents and insurance brokers own the client list, while in case of exclusive 
agents the insurance company decides on contract renewal. In contrast to that, in Germany 
insurance companies own the client list in any case, even when insurance is distributed by 
independent agents and insurance brokers (Zinnert/ Griess 1997). Nevertheless, also in Germany 
independent intermediaries are legally required to provide more comprehensive information than 
exclusive agents to their customers, otherwise they might encounter legal sanctions. Despite these 
differences, the various types of intermediaries nevertheless compete for the same consumers, in 
particular, if they distribute personal lines (Cummins/ Doherty 2006).3 Barriers to entry are 
usually low in the local or regional markets served by insurance intermediary firms. Insurance 
intermediaries are remunerated by commissions paid directly by insurance companies. These 
commissions are a percentage of the premiums sold to consumer.4 Since consumers act either 
under a “free price”-illusion or simply do not know about what percentage of the premiums they 
pay go to insurance intermediaries, price competition is quasi not existent in the market for 
                                                 
3
  Note that in this paper we are not concerned with bigger insurance brokerage firms which are specialized in 
commercial insurance lines and act on a national or international basis (Cummins/ Doherty 2006).  
4
  There are also so-called contingent premiums which are independent of premiums. But they account only for a 
rather small amount of intermediaries’ total revenues (Cummins/Doherty 2006). 
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insurance intermediation (Cummins/ Doherty 2006). Thus, insurance intermediary markets are 
characterized by monopolistic competition (Cummins/ Doherty 2006; Eckardt 2007). Insurance 
intermediaries compete for customers both by horizontal and vertical product differentiation. In 
the former case they offer different kinds of services, while in the latter they offer different 
quality levels.  
Insurance intermediary markets are also characterized by incomplete and asymmetric 
information. Information and counseling services on complex and long-term insurance purchase 
decisions are experience and credence goods (Nelson 1970; Darby/ Karni 1973; Hirshleifer 
1973). According to principal-agent theory this information asymmetry leads to low quality 
provision due to differing objectives between principals and agents. Consumers as principals 
have only incomplete information about an intermediary’s (= agent’s) characteristics, knowledge 
and experience before contract conclusion as well as about the intermediary’s proper intentions 
and actions after contract conclusion. Therefore the performance of the agent can be only 
incompletely assessed by the principal. She cannot correctly assess whether a particular 
performance is the proper result of the contractually agreed efforts of the agent under the given 
circumstances or the consequence of a contract violation. Since not all contingencies can be 
explicitly specified ex ante, there are incomplete contracts. Therefore contract fulfillment can be 
only incompletely enforced by courts ex post as well. As a consequence of the agent’s privately 
held information, adverse selection and/ or moral hazard may occur. Accordingly, no separating 
equilibrium should occur, leading to overall low service quality in the market for insurance 
intermediation (Gravelle 1993; Horsch 2004; Kurland 1995, 1996).  
Along these lines of reasoning, there is an extensive literature which analyzes the coexistence of 
insurance distribution by exclusive versus independent intermediaries from an agency or 
transaction cost perspective (Berger/ Cummins/ Weiss 1997; Regan/ Tennyson 2000). It has 
provoked a vivid discussion as to whether the persistence of independent agent distribution 
systems results from profound inefficiencies in the insurance market (market imperfection 
hypothesis) or whether it is based on specific services provided by independent agents (product 
quality hypothesis) (Berger/ Cummins/ Weiss 1997). Authors supporting the latter hypothesis 
argue that independent intermediaries are legally seen as representing the interests of policy 
holders. In case of low information service quality, they could be legally sanctioned. Besides, 
since they own the client list, they can credibly threaten insurers to switch to another company. 
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Accordingly, it is stated that independent intermediaries have incentives to provide better services 
to consumers than exclusive agents so that a separating equilibrium arises despite profound 
information asymmetries. In particular, independent intermediaries seem to be of advantage in 
mitigating agency problems between shareholders and policyholders which result from 
organizational form (Mayers/ Smith 1981; Kim/ Mayers/ Smith 1996; Regan/ Tzeng 1999; 
Baranoff/ Sager 2003). In contrast to that, vertical integration and thus reliance on exclusive 
agents seems to be more profitable for insurance companies to induce a high level of sales efforts 
from agents (Sass/ Gisser 1989). The same holds when insurers rely heavily on advertising 
(Marvel 1982, Grossmann/ Hart 1986) or on relation-specific investment (Regan 1997).  
Empirical Findings on Service Quality  
Most of the empirical studies carried out to test for the market imperfection vs. product quality 
hypothesis show a clear cost advantage of direct writers compared to independent agent insurers 
(Joskow 1973; Cummins/ VanDerhei 1979; Barrese/ Nelson 1992)5. They also seem to be better 
suited than exclusive agents for tailoring insurance coverage to consumers’ needs in insurance 
lines where complexity is high and risk assessment of customers becomes more difficult (Regan/ 
Tennyson 1996; Regan 1997, Regan/ Tzeng 1999). There is mixed evidence whether independent 
agents or brokers offer better service quality as measured by claims settlement data than 
exclusive agents (Doerpinghaus 1991; Barrese/ Doerpinghaus/ Nelson 1995). There is also 
evidence for the US market that independent agents are less beneficial for larger insurance firms 
and larger market size and for those in which long-term relations are valued (Berger/ Cummins/ 
Weiss 1997; Regan/ Tennyson 1996, 2000; Regan 1997; Regan/ Tzeng 1999).6  
These studies do not explicitly deal with the service quality provided by single intermediaries, but 
concentrate on differences in the relative efficiency of insurance companies that use different 
distribution systems. They focus primarily on the US insurance market, in particular regarding 
property-liability insurance. The units of analysis are not insurance intermediaries, but insurance 
companies. The impact of exclusive versus independent intermediaries on insurance companies’ 
                                                 
5
  However, see Trigo Gamarra (2007a) who finds for the German life insurance industry no cost advantage of 
direct insurers compared to multi-channel insurers. Independent agents show both lower cost efficiency and 
lower profit efficiency than multi-channel insurers.  
6
  Besides findings are not uniform when analyzing whether independent intermediaries are more advantage in 
mitigating agency problems. While there are positive results for the US (Kim/ Mayers/ Smith 1996; Regan/ 
Tzeng 1999; Baranoff/ Sager 2003), Ward (2003) finds just the contrary for the UK. 
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performance is analyzed by including a dummy variable which accounts for the main distribution 
channel used. Therefore these studies do not allow any statements about quality differences 
between single intermediaries belonging to the same distribution channel nor on the factors 
affecting such differences.  
There are only very few econometric papers that study more comprehensively the service quality 
provided by single insurance intermediaries. The findings of Etgar (1976) do not support the 
hypothesis that independent agents provide overall better service quality than exclusive agents. 
They are significantly more active in claims settlement than exclusive agents, but there is mixed 
evidence on their service quality regarding assistance in risk analysis and in placing insurance 
applications. Cummins/ Weisbart (1977) obtain similar results in a study on insurance 
intermediaries, which operate in three different US states in personal insurance lines. Again, 
independent agents are found to provide better claims settlement services and to review coverage 
more often, while they provide less service quality than exclusive agents in other dimensions. 
Eckardt (2002) provides a study based on German exclusive agents and insurance brokers, who 
are mainly engaged in personal lines. Mean differences parametric tests reveal a number of 
highly significant differences in both quantitative and qualitative variables that support the 
product quality hypothesis. This is in line with the findings of Trigo Gamarra (2007b). For a 
sample of exclusive and independent intermediaries active in the German life insurance industry 
she finds evidence that supports the product quality hypothesis. According to her results, the 
independent intermediaries show higher service quality than exclusive agents in regard to a 
number of different input- and output indicators, which measure service quality and performance. 
Like the product quality hypothesis states, service quality increases with the share of complex 
insurance products in an intermediary’s portfolio and with the number of additional services 
provided. 
Hypotheses 
All in all, there is mixed empirical evidence in regard to the product quality hypothesis. No 
conclusions can be drawn on other factors affecting service quality differences between 
intermediaries. Thus, from the above discussion of transaction cost, search and principal agent 
theory we draw the following hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that independent intermediaries 
provide better service quality than exclusive agents (product quality hypothesis). From 
principal agent theory it follows that a separating equilibrium between intermediaries with 
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different service quality emerges, if credible signals are given. Since insurance brokers can be 
legally sanctioned when not providing a certain (high) level of service quality, being an 
independent intermediary should be such a credible signal, implying better service quality than it 
is provided by exclusive agents. Besides, principal agent theory states that the lower the 
information asymmetries between principals and agents are, the better the product quality should 
be. Accordingly we contend that the better customers’ knowledge about insurance relevant 
matters is, the higher the service quality provided should be. 
In contrast to hypothesis 1, the following hypotheses 2 to 4 analyze a number of additional 
factors that might explain quality differences between intermediaries, independent of their legal 
status.  
Hypothesis 2 states that specialization, economies of scale and scope should have a positive 
impact on the service quality provided by an intermediary. From transaction cost economics and 
search theory it is derived that specialization and economies of scale reduce search costs for 
producing a particular quality level of service quality. With an increase in firm size insurance 
intermediaries can specialize in certain informational processing activities as well as in providing 
additional services. Thus, with an increase in employees, an intermediary firm can realize 
economies of scale. Besides, there might also be positive effects due to specializing on the 
products of a certain insurance company as well as on a certain line of insurance or on particular 
customer segments. In each case, specific information about a particular insurance company and 
her products, about a particular insurance line or about the particular risks and insurance needs of 
a certain customer segment can be used more often, once gathered by a specialized insurance 
intermediary compared to a non-specialized one. In addition, by providing additional insurance-
related services like financial counseling or claims settlement an intermediary can gain additional 
information about customers’ needs and preferences as well as about insurance companies’ 
products and behavior. If such information is used in giving advice and counseling, information 
and service quality is increased by reducing the underlying information asymmetries consumers 
and insurance companies. Thus, additional services might entail economies of scope. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the more efforts are spent by an intermediary on producing information 
services, the higher the service quality offered. More precisely, since providing information and 
giving advice on insurance transactions requires knowledge and skills on insurance economics, 
financial markets, social security and contract law to name just a few. In line with the theory it is 
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contended that the higher investment in insurance-relevant knowledge and skills is, the better the 
information gathered in the search process by an intermediary will be processed, eventually 
resulting in better service quality. Besides, we contend that the more time is spent on searching 
and processing information and on counseling customers, the higher the service quality provided 
by intermediaries is, independent of whether they are exclusive agents or independent 
intermediaries. According to search theory the larger the proportion of time devoted to 
information acquisition and processing or to counseling interviews is, the more information about 
insurance products and their characteristics as well as about the specific needs of the clients can 
be gathered and the higher the information quality would be.  
Finally, hypothesis 4 takes into account that the service quality provided by an intermediary also 
depends positively on the quality of the informational input. From search theory we derive that 
the quality of the information gained in search depends on the quality of the underlying 
information sources. The better these are and the better the acquired information is, the higher the 
service quality. In addition, from principal agent theory we derive that the quality of advice given 
by an intermediary also relies on privately held information by customers. Thus, we contend that 
the better the cooperation between the customer and the intermediary, the higher the service 
quality provided by the latter should be.  
Thus, we test the following hypotheses:  
H 1 - Product Quality Hypothesis: Independent intermediaries provide better service quality. 
H 2 - Specialization, Economies of Scale and Scope: Specialization and economies of scale and 
scope lead to better service quality. 
H 3 - Efforts Spend: The more an intermediary invests in general and insurance-specific human 
capital (knowledge and skills) and the more time an intermediary spends on information 
processing and counseling interviews, the better the service quality provided. 
H 4 - Informational Input: The better the information sources used by an intermediary are, the 
more information about relevant subjects an intermediary provides in counseling 
interviews and the more consumers’ cooperate, the better is the service quality provided. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the hypotheses to be tested, the independent variables and 
the expected relations. Hypothesis H 1 tests for the product quality hypothesis, while hypotheses 
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H 2 to H 4 refer to additional factors that affect the quality of the services provided by insurance 
intermediaries.  
3. Data and Estimation Methods 
The German Market for Insurance Intermediation 
The German market for insurance intermediaries was widely unregulated until 2007 (Mauntel 
2004; Rehberg 2003).7 There were no formal entry restrictions other than having a trading 
license. To get such a license from the Trade Supervisory Office (Gewerbeaufsichtsamt) required 
only having a certificate issued by the police stating that the holder had no criminal record. No 
registration, financial skills or financial guarantees were mandatory. Conduct regulation was also 
very weak. Exclusive agents differ from independent intermediaries regarding the legal 
responsibilities in regard to the kind and amount of information provided to consumers. For 
exclusive agents the respective insurance companies are held responsible in case an agent 
provides false or misleading information about policy benefits, terms and conditions, dividends 
or premiums. To independent intermediaries more strict liability rules in case of professional 
negligence apply. Nevertheless, professional indemnity insurance was not compulsory. 
Disclosure regulations were of a rather general nature as well. It was neither prescribed in detail 
what information had to be passed to consumers, nor in what form had this to be done. Besides it 
was customary that consumers were not informed on the commission and fees intermediaries 
received as part of the insurance premiums for their services. Therefore, they can be said to have 
acted under a “free fee” illusion. As a consequence there was no price competition in the German 
market for insurance intermediaries. Finally, there was a general ban on rebating commissions 
both for insurance agents and brokers. That is, for insurance intermediaries, resale price 
maintenance was legally sanctioned. 
Our data is obtained from a survey among 4,687 self-employed German insurance intermediaries, 
which was carried out in autumn 2001. The addresses of the interviewees were randomly chosen 
from online directories and from the yellow pages. 927 insurance intermediaries answered the 
                                                 
7
  Because of reforms of the German insurance law and the implementation on the EU Directive on Insurance 
Intermediation now stricter rules apply to insurance intermediaries. But these new rules are of no importance for 
the following analysis, since our survey was carried out in 2001. 
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questionnaire, implying a response rate of 20%.8 Among the respondents 423 are self-employed 
exclusive insurance agents, 504 independent intermediaries.9 Data was collected about individual 
and firm characteristics of the interviewed insurance intermediaries, the services offered, the 
intermediation process and general market conditions.10   
Dependent Variables 
Insurance intermediary services comprehend mainly information services, but also additional 
services, like risk assessment, claims settlement or loss management. Since services are 
intangible, their quality cannot be measured in an objective way. Therefore, we estimate four 
different performance measures in markets for insurance intermediation. The first three, 
information index, additional services and service index are input-oriented, measuring 
information and additional services provided by intermediaries. The last one, the contract 
conclusion rate, is a proxy for insurance intermediaries’ economic success. It indicates whether 
providing service quality is economically profitable for insurance intermediaries. Besides, it can 
be also seen as a more subjective output-oriented indicator pointing to how content customers are 
with the service quality provided. 
The variable information index is a proxy for the information quality provided by insurance 
intermediaries. It is a summary indicator that captures the weight that an insurance intermediary 
attaches to 27 subjects about a customer’s need for insurance protection, insurance products and 
                                                 
8
  Since there are no market data available on the service quality provided by insurance intermediaries, the optimal 
way of collecting information about insurance intermediaries’ service quality would be to conduct a high enough 
number of mystery shopping interviews and then combine them with data about the interviewed intermediaries’ 
service production activities. However, due to financial constraints this was not possible, so that a survey was 
carried out. Although this might entail committing a type II error, our sample size seems reasonably large 
enough to avoid it. The potential of committing such an error can be further reduced by increasing the 
significance level and thus the potential of committing a type I error, since both errors are inversely related. For 
more details on this see Diekmann (2000, 585-602), Stock/ Watson (2003, 68-69). 
9
  As there has been no legal duty to register for insurance intermediaries in Germany at that time, the total 
population is unknown. The sample represents the regional demographic distribution of the German population 
well (Federal Statistical Office 2004, 26). It also captures the main distribution channels, which account for two 
thirds of the total premium income gained in the German insurance market in 2001 (GDV 2002). 
10
  As the pretest showed a very low willingness to answer questions to remuneration patterns, costs, turnovers, and 
profits, they were omitted from the survey. For empirical evidence on compensation schemes see Zweifel/ 
Ghermi (1990), Laslett/ Wilsdon/ Malcolm (2002) and Cummins/ Doherty (2006). 
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coverage, policy design and contract terms.11 Half the items deal with the particularities of 
private old-age insurance. This is justified by the fact that this insurance line makes for the largest 
share of the interviewed insurance intermediaries’ income (Eckardt 2002). For each item the 
interviewee is asked how much importance (with 1 = totally unimportant to 5 = very important) 
he gives to it in his counseling interviews. Then, for each intermediary the mean value is 
calculated after summing up all 27 items. Although this input-oriented variable is concerned with 
the content of the information provided, it makes neither statements about the actual information 
provided nor whether the information provided is accurate from an objective point of view since 
participants may overstate their service quality. However, response bias can be reasonably 
assumed to occur similarly for all interviewees (Etgar 1976).12 As a consequence however, our 
focus is not on the values of the coefficient estimates reported in the regressions, but on their 
signs.  
Since insurance intermediaries not only provide information, but also additional transaction 
related services, we use the variable additional services, which measures how many additional 
services are supplied to consumers besides information services. Finally, we construct an 
aggregate service index variable as a proxy to account for total service quality provided. For this 
we normalise the information index and the additional services variables before aggregating them 
additively. Since we assume that information services are the most important services provided 
by insurance intermediaries,13 the information index variable enters the service index with double 
weight compared to the additional services variable.  
As a further measure we use the contract conclusion rate variable as a proxy for market 
performance and economic success. It indicates the percentage of counseling interviews an 
intermediary conducts that on average result in consumers actually concluding an insurance 
                                                 
11
  These items result inter alia from interviews with experts on consumer protection in personal insurance. For 
more details on the single items, see the variables underlying the factor analysis in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the 
Appendix. 
12
  The results of the mean difference parametric tests in Eckardt (2002) indicate that there is only weak response 
bias. 
13
  See in section 2 above the reasoning of transaction costs economics and search theory on insurance 
intermediaries as information intermediaries. 
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contract.14 It shows whether the provision of high information quality positively influences an 
intermediary’s economic performance. In addition, this output-oriented variable can be also 
interpreted as a more subjective indicator of the service quality provided. It indicates whether 
customers are satisfied with the information and advice given by an intermediary during a 
counseling interview as with the additional services provided. Accordingly, the higher an 
intermediary’s contract conclusion rate is, the better is her service quality as subjectively 
perceived by consumers.  
Independent Variables 
The behavior of insurance intermediaries may differ according to their (in-)dependence from 
insurance companies and because of different regulatory rules. The variable intermediary type 
distinguishes between the distribution channels exclusive agents and independent 
intermediaries.15 Intermediaries help consumers to reduce search costs because they are assumed 
to have a better market overview, thus providing more comprehensive information about a 
number of different insurance companies and their products.  
While independent agents and brokers provide information about a number of different insurance 
companies, exclusive agents however, represent only a single insurance company and its 
products. Although this implies that they provide less comprehensive information than 
independent intermediaries, the overall effect on the service quality might be ambiguous. By 
specializing on a particular insurance company, an intermediary can gain an in-depth knowledge 
of this particular insurance company and its products that an intermediary with a broader market 
overview might not have. To account for this potentially offsetting effect, we include the 
variables specialization on an insurance company and its products and insurance company 
reputation. It measures what weight intermediaries attach to the insurance company whose 
products they distribute for gaining high reputation themselves. By this we take into account that 
specialization on a certain insurance company might be the outcome of a deliberate selection 
process. If an exclusive agent chooses to work for a high quality insurance company, he can 
benefit from its reputation and concentrate on providing in-depth information about its products.  
                                                 
14
  Note that this success rate is not a profitability measure since it provides no information on the premiums of the 
contracts concluded or on the costs spent by them. 
15
  Note that independent intermediaries comprehend both independent agents and insurance brokers. Accordingly 
we use these terms synonymously in the following. 
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To further capture the impact of specialization effects and economies of scale in producing 
intermediation services, we include a number of other variables which account for firm size, 
specialization on a certain insurance line (old-age insurance) and on customer segments. The 
more specialized an insurance intermediary is in these respects, the better the information quality 
provided should be, since she can realize economies of scale. Besides, we asked for the number 
of additional services provided (additional services) to see whether there are economies of scope. 
Finally, to control for the impact of competition in the markets of insurance intermediation we 
add a variable that measures the competitive pressure. It follows from monopolistic competition 
that an increase in competition should result in a higher degree of product differentiation. In our 
case this would imply better information quality and more additional services, the higher the 
competitive pressure. 
The questionnaire inquired about human capital variables as inputs used for producing 
information and transaction services. The age of the intermediary and investment in human 
capital (formal education, (additional) training, university degree, work experience, further 
training) are proxies to account for service quality.16 Besides, the participants were asked which 
percentage of their total time budget they spent on different activities (information acquisition 
and processing, counseling interviews, further training, claims settlement, sales efforts). 
Furthermore, the average duration of counseling interviews in absolute terms is used to account 
for the quantitative input to service production (duration_interviews).  
The quality of the information provided depends also on the quality of the information sources 
used. To gain information about this aspect, we calculate the variable information source as the 
product of the importance of a certain information provider (like an insurance company or a 
rating agency) to an intermediary and the objectivity she attaches to it. For further trainings there 
is no variable that shows the credibility attached to it as a reliable information source. Therefore, 
source_further training indicates only the importance of this information source without making 
statements about its perceived objectivity by an intermediary. We expect that intermediaries, who 
rely strongly on more credible information sources, provide better information quality to their 
customers. 
                                                 
16
  Such proxies are widely used in empirical studies on relationship lending to account for the quality of lenders 
and thus to assess the degree of asymmetric information between banks and their customers. See for example 
Berger/ Udell (1990) and Neuberger/ Raethke-Doeppner (2008). 
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To account for the information content provided, the interviewees were asked which weight they 
give to 27 different aspects in counseling interviews that are relevant from an objective point of 
view for consumers to decide rationally about insurance coverage (see above information 
index).17 It is assumed that an intermediary informs her customers more extensively about those 
aspects to which she attaches more weight. Together with general information, product 
information and information on contract design, the interviewees were questioned about 
particular topics relevant for old-age insurance. Furthermore, as the participation in surplus is an 
important sales argument for life assurances, different items were asked about this subject to see 
how much weight intermediaries put on informing consumers about the components of the 
calculations normally used. By performing a factor analysis, seven factors were extracted which 
are used as independent variables to account for the information content provided (Tables A.4 and 
A.5 in the Appendix).18 They comprehend information on personal risk profile and security 
options, general aspects on insurance, private old-age insurance products, policy design, 
contract design, contract execution and calculation of participation rates. 
Differences in customers’ knowledge about insurance matters can also lead to differences in the 
information quality provided, since it reduces information asymmetries between consumers and 
intermediaries. Generally, the more knowledge consumers have about insurance relevant 
subjects, the higher the information quality of an intermediary is expected to be. Otherwise, there 
is the threat that discontent customers would turn to another intermediary. Besides, the 
production of information services is the result of a cooperative effort. Besides, the quality of the 
advice given by an intermediary also depends on information privately held by a customer. The 
more knowledge a customer has on insurance relevant matters, the less effort the intermediary 
has to spend to extract this information by the customer.  
We also include two consumer demand variables; one that measures customers’ demand for 
information services and one that accounts for their demand for additional services for free. We 
asked whether such demand of an intermediary’s customers has increased over the last six 
                                                 
17
  Since the dependent variable information index is based on the same 27 items, the following variables are only 
used as regressors on the additional services and on the contract conclusion rate variables. See models 2 and 4 
in Table 1 below. 
18
 Although factor analysis assumes interval data, Jaccard and Wan (1996, 4) summarize in a review of the 
literature on this topic that with ordinal Likert scale items “for many statistical tests, rather severe departures 
(from intervalness) do not seem to affect Type I and Type II errors dramatically.”  
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months. In 2001, pension reform had been high on the public agenda in Germany and had been 
widely covered in the media. To cope with the demographic changes ahead, reforms entailed the 
introduction of tax-subsidized private pensions in addition to the so far rather comprehensive 
public pension schemes. Accordingly, given the rather agitated public (and private) debates about 
the future of one’s pension entitlements, a higher demand for information services should have a 
positive impact on the information and service quality actually provided. The same holds for the 
demand for additional services.19  Customers’ knowledge and demand variables are also proxies 
for how intense cooperation between an intermediary and his customer is. The more intense it is, 
the more privately held information consumers’ are assumed to disclose. 
Estimation Methods 
The hypotheses are tested by using OLS-estimations,20 since the service quality depends 
primarily on supply-side factors. As there is imperfect and asymmetric information on 
consumers’ side about the true information quality provided by intermediaries, the feedback 
mechanism between insurance intermediaries’ service quality and the number of consumers using 
them is strongly weakened. Accordingly, we can use OLS instead of, for example, Two-Stage-
Least-Squares (2SLS) estimations, which should be otherwise applied to avoid simultaneous 
equation bias.  
In addition, there are also methodological reasons for using OLS. Most importantly, we are not 
aware of any meaningful variable which could be used as an instrument in 2SLS or other related 
estimation methods.21 Intermediaries’ services are mainly intangible goods which are produced 
by interaction. The service quality provided by an intermediary depends to a large degree on 
gaining information of his or her customers’ preferences, needs, and risks through 
communication. Such information is an input factor in producing high quality information 
services. Thus, during a counseling interview an intermediary can obtain information about 
                                                 
19
  Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes the definition and measurement of the variables. The main descriptive 
statistics of the variables are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
20
  For the assumptions of the linear OLS regression, see Greene (2000, 210-264). The estimations are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity where necessary. For multicollinearity see the correlation matrix in Table A.6 in the 
Appendix. 
21
  For this, a variable should affect only consumers’ demand for service quality, but have no impact on 
intermediaries’ decisions on their quality supply, that is it should be both relevant and exogenous, see Stock/ 
Watson (2003, 331-372). 
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variables that affect his customers’ demand for information quality. Because of the prevalent 
information asymmetries, the intermediary can use this information to his own advantage in 
supplying his profit-maximizing quality level. Because all variables that affect consumers’ 
demand for service quality can be communicated in counseling interviews, therefore they also 
affect the service quality actually supplied by an intermediary. Thus, they are not exogenous and 
therefore cannot be used as an instrument in 2SLS. Besides, we are not concerned with the 
absolute values of the estimated coefficients, but only with their signs. Finally, we have no 
information on the number of consumers or the sales volume of the single intermediaries. Thus, 
form a quite practical point of view OLS is the best solution to estimate the service quality 
provided by an intermediary. 
For the independent continuous variables age, work experience, further training_number, 
duration_interviews, information source, source further training and additional services we 
assume that they have a positive, but decreasing effect on the service quality provided. Thus, we 
use their log in the estimated equations. For the dependent variables information index, additional 
services and service index we perform semi-log OLS-estimations. For the contract conclusion 
rate as dependent variable we apply a logistic function (Cooper/ Nakanishi 1988). This accounts 
for the fact that, when starting from a low level, increases in inputs first result in 
disproportionately high and then in disproportionately low increases in the contract conclusion 
rate.  
All in all, we perform three specifications for each dependent variable. Models 1 to 4 test for the 
product quality hypothesis (hypothesis 1) and for specialization and economies of scale and scope 
(hypothesis 2), while models 5 to 8 test for the impact of the efforts spend (hypothesis 3) and of 
informational inputs (hypothesis 4). The effect of combining all hypotheses is shown in models 9 
to 12. For the variables used in each specification see Table A.1 in the Appendix. The results are 
discussed in the following section. 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
The empirical results of the OLS regression equations are reported in Tables 1 and 2 below. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Hypothesis 1 – Product Quality Hypothesis 
The product quality hypothesis states that independent intermediaries provide better service 
quality than exclusive agents. According to all our models, this is confirmed when using the 
information index or the contract conclusion rate as dependent variable. Compared to being an 
independent intermediary, being an exclusive agent and, thus, more dependent from insurance 
companies has a significantly negative impact both on the information quality provided and on 
the contract conclusion rate realized. These findings confirm hypothesis 1 according to which 
information quality should be the higher the more independent intermediaries are from single 
insurance companies. Independent intermediaries provide significantly better information 
services, which is also honored by customers in that they realize better market performance than 
exclusive agents.  
While these results support the product quality hypothesis, when using additional services as 
dependent variable we find quite the opposite effect, with exclusive agents providing a 
significantly higher number of additional services. This finding might be due to the particularities 
of monopolistic competition, which characterizes the market for insurance intermediaries. 
Exclusive agents are more constrained than independent intermediaries when it comes to vertical 
product differentiation. Since they depend in regard to the number and quality of the insurance 
products they distribute on the insurance company they represent, they are more constrained in 
increasing information quality. Thus they have to rely more on horizontal product differentiation, 
i.e. on offering additional services. This finding is supported by our estimations, as the variable 
insurance company reputation has a significantly positive impact on the information quality in 
model 1, while it has a significantly negative impact on the number of additional services 
provided in model 2. Intermediaries which are convinced on the quality of the insurance 
companies they represent specialize more in providing high quality information services and 
offer fewer additional services. However, this does not result in a significant increase of market 
performance as measured by the contract conclusion rate.  
Finally, when using the service index as dependent variable we find no statistically significant 
differences between exclusive agents and independent intermediaries. Obviously this results from 
the contrary effects that exclusive agents show on information services resp. additional services 
as shown in models 1 and 2, for example.   
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From principal agent theory we derived that customers’ knowledge reduces information 
asymmetries and thus leads to an increase in the service quality provided. However, according to 
our estimations service quality does not depend on the degree of information asymmetries 
between consumers and intermediaries as measured by consumers’ knowledge about insurance 
related matters (models 1 to 4). 
All in all our data give mixed evidence on the product quality hypothesis, depending on the 
proxies we use to account for service quality. Our estimations support that independent 
intermediaries provide better quality in regard to information services, which also shows in better 
market performance. In contrast, we find no differences between exclusive and independent 
intermediaries in regard to total service quality, while the product quality hypothesis even has to 
be rejected with respect to additional services.  
Hypothesis 2 – Specialization and Economies of Scale and Scope 
Models 1 to 4 also test for the impact of specialization and economies of scale and scope on the 
service quality provided by insurance intermediaries. The coefficient estimates for firm size show 
no significant impact on the quality of the information services, the total service quality or the 
contract conclusion rate. Only for additional services we find a significantly negative effect for 
small firm size. Obviously, it does pay less for smaller intermediary firms to offer additional 
services than for larger ones. Besides, also specialization on a certain insurance company and its 
products shows no statistically significant coefficient estimates. In contrast to that, specialization 
on old age insurance has a significantly positive impact on both the provision of additional 
services as well as on total service quality (models 2 and 3). There are a number of different 
products to account for old age provisions, like life insurance or annuities, but also investment 
funds. This provides ample scope for intermediaries to offer additional services like financial 
counseling, investment found business etc. to consumers, which in turn also increases total 
service quality. We also find a positive impact for specialization on customer segments on the 
information quality and the total service quality provided, which is also statistically significant in 
models 1 and 3. As theory suggests, intermediaries that specialize on particular customers can 
reuse information for this segment more often. Accordingly it pays for them to invest more in 
acquiring and processing information which is specific to this particular customer segment, which 
in turn results in higher information and service quality. However, according to model 4 this does 
not reflect in a higher contract conclusion rate.  
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Finally, when using the variable additional services as independent, we find significantly positive 
coefficient estimates for the information index and the contract conclusion rate. Obviously, 
providing more additional services increases the quality of the information services provided and 
also results in a higher contract conclusion rate, thus reflecting consumers’ satisfaction with an 
intermediary’s services. Thus, our findings seem to support the thesis that economies of scope 
can be realized.  
When controlling for consumers’ demand on information provision and on additional services for 
free, our estimations show a mostly significantly positive impact on the information index, 
additional services and the service index in all our models. However, there is no statistically 
significant effect on the economic performance as measured by the contract conclusion rate. 
When controlling for efforts spent and informational inputs in models 6 and 10, we find that high 
demand for information services by consumers significantly reduces the number of additional 
services provided. All in all, intermediaries seem to take the demand of their customers into 
account in the extent and type of services provided. Note that competitive pressure has a 
significantly negative impact on the contract conclusion rate. In particular, it does not affect the 
information service quality in a significant way. 
Hypothesis 3 – Efforts Spent 
In models 5 to 8 we analyze the impact of investment in human capital and insurance related 
knowledge and skills as well as of the time spent for different activities as proxies to explain 
differences in service quality between intermediaries. Since independent intermediaries distribute 
information of products from more insurance companies than exclusive agents, we include the 
intermediary type to control for the resulting differences in search efforts.  
According to our estimation results neither formal educational levels, additional training22 nor 
work experience have any explanatory power in regard to the different quality indicators used. 
Thus, it makes no sense for consumers to use these as signals for the information and service 
quality of an intermediary. Age shows a significantly negative impact on the number of additional 
services provided (model 6). This might account for the fact that providing additional services 
requires additional investment in the knowledge and skills. Following human capital theory one 
                                                 
22
  Only in regard to the contract conclusion rate we find that intermediaries with additional training do perform 
poorer, see equ.8. 
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can argue that the readiness to incur such investment decreases with age, since the older an 
intermediary is, the more dubious it becomes whether she will be able to realize the gains from 
such an investment in her remaining working life. Besides, model 8 shows that the contract 
conclusion rate is also negatively affected by an intermediary’s age. This might result from the 
fact that new business becomes less important the older an intermediary is, since she derives her 
main income from long-term customers. While further trainings have a significantly positive 
effect on the services provided (models 5 to 7), this does not pay in terms of contracts concluded. 
Quite to the contrary we find a significantly negative impact on the contract conclusion rate 
(model 8). However, one should be cautious in interpreting this in a causal way, since it also 
seems plausible that the lower the contract conclusion rate, the more further trainings an 
intermediary attends – hoping to learn about how to become more successful.  
When using the information index as the dependent variable, in models 5 and 9 the coefficient 
estimates for the percentage of time spent on counseling interviews, further training and claims 
settlement are significantly positive. These results are consistent with hypothesis 3 that more 
efforts spent on activities which are related to the production of information services increase 
their quality. Obviously, insurance intermediaries gain specific knowledge about what topics and 
what information is relevant for consumers mainly through investment in further trainings and by 
claims settlement. These two activities exhibit large fixed costs. Besides, information about 
claims settlement is highly specific. It entails consumer-specific information about the likelihood 
of damage and insurance company-specific information about the consequences of specific 
contract terms for claims settlement as well as insurance companies’ handling in case of loss. 
Thus, these results also support the hypothesis that intermediated search has advantages which 
cannot be attained through personal search by consumers. For a single consumer neither the high 
costs of attending insurance intermediaries’ further trainings would pay off nor does she have the 
opportunity to acquire the activity-specific knowledge resulting from claims settlement. But 
although claims settlement activities improve the service quality provided, they do not pay off for 
intermediaries in terms of economic success. Time spent on claims settlement has a negative, and 
in model 12 also significant impact on the contract conclusion rate. Besides, the coefficient 
estimate for the percentage of time spent on sales efforts shows a significantly negative impact on 
the contract conclusion rate both in models 8 and 12. This implies that more sales efforts are 
primarily incurred when contract conclusion rates are low, that is when economic success is poor. 
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The coefficient estimate for the absolute time spent on counseling interviews 
(duration_interviews) shows a significantly positive impact across all service quality indicators in 
models 5 to 12 with the exception of the additional services offered (models 6 and 10). Time 
spent for counseling thus enhances both the information quality provided as well as the total 
service quality supplied and finally also results in a higher percentage of contracts concluded by 
an insurance intermediary.  
Summarizing, our evidence does not confirm hypothesis 3, this holds while even controlling for 
insurance intermediary type. Our data show that it does neither makes sense for consumers to use 
formal educational levels or training certificates as a signal for high service quality, nor does it 
pay for intermediaries to invest more in human capital, at least not when the contract conclusion 
rate is used as a proxy for economic success. However, specific activities like claims settlement 
and further training show a positive impact. Not surprisingly, time spent for counseling 
interviews proves to be statistically significant for information and services quality. It also pays 
for intermediaries, since it increases their market performance as measured in the contract 
conclusion rate. 
Hypothesis 4 – Informational Input 
Finally, hypothesis 4 analyzes what impact informational input has on the quality of the 
intermediation services provided. While models 5, 7, 9 and 11 estimate the effect of different 
information sources and consumers’ cooperation, models 6, 8, 10 and 12 also account for the 
informational content provided in counseling interviews.23  
The estimation results for models 5 and 9 indicate that intermediaries, who rely strongly on 
rating agencies, the science and specialist publications as sources of credible information, 
provide significantly higher information quality as well as total service quality. In regard to 
information quality also a high reliance on consumers’ associations as a credible source of 
information shows a significantly positive impact. In comparison, estimation results suggest that 
the more important further trainings are as a source of gathering information for intermediaries, 
the lower the information and total service quality provided is. This indicates that information, 
knowledge and skills as circulated in further trainings is not conducive to increasing information 
                                                 
23
  Since these variables enter the information index and the total service index, we omit them in the models using 
these variables as dependent.  
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quality (models 5 and 9), which also shows in its negative effect on total service quality in 
models 7 and 11. This also leads to poor economic performance as measured by the contract 
conclusion rate (model 8).  
Furthermore, our data reveals a significantly positive impact of the information content provided 
on the number of additional services provided, if an intermediary puts higher weight on 
informing customers on general aspects and on their personal risk profile and security options. 
The coefficient estimates in models 8 and 12 show a significantly positive effect on the contract 
conclusion rate, the more weight an intermediary puts on informing his customers on their 
personal risk profile and security options and on the calculation of participation rates of life 
insurance products. In contrast to that, providing information about policy design, contract design 
and contract execution shows no significant impact across all models. Despite their alleged 
importance for the quality of the insurance purchase transaction, consumers seem not to honor it 
(as there is no significant impact on the contract conclusion rate).  
The service quality provided by an insurance intermediary is in part the outcome of an interactive 
process between the intermediary and the customer, since it also depends on the revelation of 
privately held information by the consumer. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the better the 
cooperation between intermediary and consumer works, the higher the service quality should be. 
To account for this, we employ consumers’ knowledge about different insurance relevant matters 
as well as their demand for information provision and additional services as proxies. The higher 
their knowledge resp. demand is, the better the overall outcome should be. For the information 
index (model 5) and for the service index (model 7) our estimations show significantly positive 
coefficient estimates for consumers’ knowledge about their risk profile. These findings suggest 
that intermediaries provide only additional information and thus higher information quality, if 
their customers already have a high level of knowledge about their risk profile, but a low level of 
knowledge about protection for old-age security. There are two possible answers to this finding. 
On the one hand, this is the expected result, since half of the items summarized in the dependent 
variable information index concern old-age protection. It is unnecessary for an intermediary to 
put much weight on such topics, if his customers already have a high level of knowledge about 
them. On the other hand, insurance intermediaries rely strongly on income from selling life 
insurance policies and other products concerning old-age security. Accordingly, they should have 
an interest in increasing consumers’ knowledge about exactly such insurance products. This is in 
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line with the finding that insurance intermediaries do not provide significantly more information 
to customers with low knowledge on the disadvantages of insurance products compared to other 
financial assets which can be used as substitutes. In regard to additional services and to the 
contract conclusion rate consumers’ knowledge seems to play no role, since we find no 
statistically relevant influence. To summarize, consumers cannot expect intermediaries to 
automatically provide additional information in case they have only limited knowledge. This 
supports the statement of principal agent theory according to which under information 
asymmetries only low service quality should result.  
Although the cooperation between insurance intermediaries and their customers affects the 
quality of the advice given, consumers might nevertheless differ in their willingness to participate 
in the counseling process. To account for such differences among consumers, we use consumers’ 
demand for information provision and consumers’ demand for additional services for free as 
proxies. Models 5 and 6 confirm our findings already stated in regard to hypothesis 2. Obviously, 
consumer’s can induce insurance intermediaries to provide better information and service quality 
by communicating a higher demand for it. However, it does not increase the contract conclusion 
rate.  
All in all, our evidence shows some support for the findings of transaction costs, search and 
principal agent theory as stated in hypothesis 4 according to which the service quality provided 
positively depends on the underlying informational input and on cooperation between the 
intermediary and her customer. However, there seems to be a conflict for intermediaries between 
economic success as measured by the contract conclusion rate and providing detailed 
information about relevant contractual aspects of insurance coverage. Together with the profound 
information asymmetries between intermediaries and consumers it, thus, follows that that for 
rational intermediaries high quality information services will not come first.  
Discussion 
To see the effect of combining our hypotheses, we estimate models 9 to 12 (Table 2 below). They 
show that our findings from models 1 to 8 are quite robust (see discussion above). In addition the 
explanatory power of our estimations clearly improves, when including variables that account for 
the efforts spent and the informational inputs used in providing intermediation services. The 
adjusted Rsquares of all four service variable proxies increase from models 1 to 4 to models 9 to 
12 by between 6% and 12%. This clearly indicates that service quality depends not only on 
  29 
whether intermediaries are more or less (in-)dependent from insurance companies. There are 
additional differences in the service quality provided by intermediaries which cannot be 
explained by them being either exclusive agents or insurance brokers, but by the information 
gathering and processing activities they perform.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
For analyzing how sensitive our findings are with respect to the functional forms applied, we 
carried out a number of logit and double-log estimations.24 Their results confirm the main 
findings from above. Besides, we performed a number of stability tests. They also show no 
indication that omitted variables or incorrect functional form create bias in the coefficient 
estimates. In addition, we performed post-hoc statistical power tests which provide no evidence 
that our regressions suffer from low statistical power.25  
5. Conclusions 
Quite in accordance with the empirical literature our estimations also provide no uniform 
evidence on the product quality hypothesis. According to our findings, independent agents and 
insurance brokers provide better service quality when information services and their contract 
conclusion rates are used as proxies, while exclusive agents provide significantly more additional 
services. When taken together, then, there are no significant differences to be found between 
these various distribution channels in regard to the total service quality provided.  
Also in regard l to hypothesis 2 on specialization and economies of scale, our findings are not 
uniform. Increasing firm size enables insurance intermediaries to realize economies of scale only 
in regard to the provision of additional services. Our data do not give evidence that firm size 
matters in regard to information quality, total service quality or the contract conclusion rate. 
Accordingly, acquiring and processing information about topics relevant for concluding an 
insurance contract seem to exhibit divisibility among members of the same agency. This is in line 
                                                 
24
  Since these estimations provide no additional explanatory power, we omitted them in the reported estimations 
below. Regression results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
25
  According to Cohen (1988) a test has sufficient power given a power value of at least 0.8. The power values are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
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with findings of Cummins (1977) that there are no scale economies for independent insurance 
agents. Besides, according to our findings there are also no economies of scale to be realized by 
specializing on an insurance company and its products or on a certain insurance line. However, 
there is some evidence that economies of scale can be realized by specializing on customer 
segments. Besides, in accordance with ypothesis 2 we found clear evidence that economies of 
scope can be realized by offering additional services.  
As concerns the efforts spent by insurance intermediaries, we find that the duration of counseling 
interviews is the single most important factor that has a positive effect both on the information 
quality and on the total service quality provided, while it simultaneously also pays for 
intermediaries as it increases their contract conclusion rate. In contrast to that, we find no 
evidence that different educational levels or additional trainings show a significant impact. Thus, 
such certificates should not be used by consumers as indicators of high service quality. Moreover, 
our data give some support for findings derived from transaction costs, search and principal agent 
theory that the service quality provided is positively affected by the informational inputs used. 
Finally, we find that despite the profound information asymmetries between insurance 
intermediaries and their customers, consumers’ demand for information and additional services 
indeed results in better service quality. Thus, more demanding consumers should expect 
intermediaries to provide better counseling and advisory services.  
All in all, we thus find that the service quality of insurance intermediaries does not only depend 
on whether they are exclusive agents or insurance brokers. There are also quality differences that 
cannot be accounted for by the distribution channel and its characteristics to which an 
intermediary belongs. According to our findings, the quality of the services provided depends 
also to a large extent on their information gathering and processing activities of the individual 
intermediaries. Because of the important role insurance intermediaries play in insurance markets 
in reducing information asymmetries between consumers and insurance companies, additional 
research should be undertaken to better understand how high service quality is produced. Thus, 
research efforts should concentrate not only on explaining the coexistence of different 
distribution systems, but also on explaining differences in service quality within a particular 
distribution channel. Besides, further efforts are necessary to find better proxies to account for 
insurance intermediaries’ service quality. One main limitation of our data is that they do not 
allow us to make any statements about the informational content actually provided by an 
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intermediary to his customers. To get such data, for example a combination of mystery shopping 
interviews with a follow-up survey on the information processing activities of the interviewed 
intermediaries could be performed.  
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Table 1:  Regression Results 
a
 Dependent variable: log (contract conclusion rate/(1-contract conclusion rate)) 
 Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
OLS 
Model 4 
OLS 
Model 5 
OLS 
Model 6 
OLS 
Model 7 
OLS 
Modell 8 
OLS 
 N = 776 N = 785 N = 783 N = 701 N = 647 N = 600 N = 647 N = 553 
Dependent Variables 
Information 
Index 
Additional 
Serivices 
Service 
Index 
Contract 
conclusion 
rate a 
Information 
Index 
Additional 
Serivices Service Index 
Contract 
conclusion 
rate a 
Constant 
2.730*** 
(15.14) 
6.113*** 
(9.81) 
9.741*** 
(23.62) 
1.200*** 
(3.23) 
1.136*** 
(2.12) 
11,175*** 
(4.26) 
7.847*** 
(5.53) 
5.224*** 
(3.76) 
Independent Variables 
     
 
  
Intermediary type 
     
 
  
Exclusive agent -0.278*** 
(-4.54) 
0.943*** 
(3.28) 
-0.156 
(-0.79) 
-0.337** 
(-1.94) 
-0.171*** 
(-3.82) 
0.811*** 
(3.39) 
0.035 
(0.26) 
-0.574*** 
(-4.30) 
Firm size 
     
 
  
Small (1 to 3 employees) 0.061 
(1.48) 
-0.729*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.053 
(-0.44) 
0.119 
(1.31)  
 
  
Large (more then 9 employees) -0.076 
(-1.13) 
0.111 
(0.31) 
-0.038 
(-0.17) 
0.158 
(0.91)  
 
  
Specialization 
     
 
  
Insurance company -0.007 
(-0.13) 
-0.273 
(-0.96) 
-0.114 
(-0.59) 
-0.205 
(-1.18)  
 
  
Insurance company reputation 0.063*** 
(3.28) 
-0.280*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
0.016 
(0.38)  
 
  
Insurance line -0.019 
(-0.50) 
0.807*** 
(4.85) 
0.242** 
(2.28) 
-0.070 
(-0.80)  
 
  
Customer Segment 0.074** 
(1.97) 
0.181 
(1.09) 
0.258** 
(2.35) 
0.011 
(0.13)  
 
  
Additional Services 
0.154*** 
(3.28)   
0.326*** 
(2.81)  
 
  
Competitive pressure -0.007 
(-0.35) 
-0.156* 
(-1.86) 
-0.054 
(-0.95) 
-0.320*** 
(-7.19)  
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Table 1:  Regression Results (cont.) 
 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
OLS 
Model 4 
OLS 
Model 5 
OLS 
Model 6 
OLS 
Model 7 
OLS 
Modell 8 
OLS 
Customers’ knowledge 
     
 
  
Risk profile 0.035 
(1.32) 
0.025 
(0.21) 
0.104 
(1.33) 
0.037 
(0.57) 
0.069*** 
(2.52) 
0.076 
(0.57) 
0.208*** 
(2.56) 
0.013 
(0.17) 
Old-age protection provisions -0.024 
(-0.84) 
0.061 
(0.48) 
-0.051 
(-0.62) 
0.099 
(1.49) 
-0.067** 
(-2.11) 
0.199 
(1.40) 
-0.139* 
(-1.62) 
0.097 
(1.21) 
(Dis-) Advantages of insurance products 0.027 
(1.08) 
-0.281** 
(-2.34) 
-0.075 
(-0.99) 
-0.114** 
(-1.98) 
0.027 
(0.96) 
-0.231* 
(-1.64) 
-0.063 
(-0.82) 
-0.073 
(-1.03) 
Customers’ demand 
     
 
  
Information provision 0.070** 
(2.26) 
0.154 
(1.26) 
0.183** 
(2.32) 
0.005 
(0.09) 
0.064** 
(1.99) 
-0.229* 
(-1.62) 
0.065 
(0.77) 
-0.060 
(-0.76) 
Additional services for free 0.106*** 
(4.51) 
0.160* 
(1.59) 
0.261*** 
(4.08) 
0.008 
(0.17) 
0.070*** 
(2.82) 
0.199** 
(1.84) 
0.209*** 
(3.18) 
-0.028 
(-0.48) 
Age 
    
0.179 
(1.29) 
-1.977*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.479 
(-1.20) 
-1.179*** 
(-3.07) 
Formal education 
     
 
  
Lower secondary school 
    
0.094 
(1.21) 
0.149 
(0.44) 
0.245 
(1.18) 
-0.078 
(-0.43) 
Intermediate leaving certificate 
    
0.050 
(1.00) 
0.109 
(0.43) 
0.152 
(1.06) 
0.070 
(0.55) 
Certificate of aptitude for specialized short 
course in higher education     
0.028 
(0.53) 
-0.177 
(-0.63) 
0.029 
(0.18) 
0.191 
(1.36) 
(Additional) Training 
    
0.019 
(0.29) 
0.239 
(0.74) 0.046 (0.24) 
-0.308** 
(-1.82) 
University degree 
    
-0.032 
(-0.63) 
0.274 
(1.07) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
-0.076 
(-0.55) 
Work experience 
    
-0.032 
(-0.63) 
0.241 
(0.95) 
0.019 
(0.13) 
0.190 
(1.26) 
Further training_number 
    
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.341** 
(2.40) 
0.067 
(0.78) 
-0.136** 
(-1.90) 
Time budget 
     
 
  
Information acquisition and processing 
    
-0.017 
(-0.11) 
-0.520 
(-0.67) 
-0.552 
(-1.17) 
-0.262 
(-0.57) 
Counseling interviews 
    
0.225** 
(1.86) 
0.141 
(0.22) 
0.235 
(0.65) 
0.300 
(0.88) 
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Table 1:  Regression Results (cont.) 
 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
OLS 
Model 4 
OLS 
Model 5 
OLS 
Model 6 
OLS 
Model 7 
OLS 
Modell 8 
OLS 
Further training 
    
0.068** 
(2.28) 
1.499 
(1.01) 
2.054** 
(2.33) 
-0.094 
(-0.13) 
Claims settlement 
    
0.649*** 
(2.63) 
-0.382 
(-0.30) 
0.572 
(0.78) 
-0.247 
(-0.36) 
Sales efforts 
    
-0.186 
(-0.52) 
-0.594 
(-0.36) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
-3.730*** 
(-364) 
Duration_interviews 
    
0.105*** 
(3.16) 
0.170 
(0.94) 
0.377*** 
(3.83) 
0.231*** 
(2.63) 
Information source 
     
 
  
Insurance companies 
    
0.028 
(0.86) 
-0.124 
(-0.76) 
0.064 
(0.78) 
0.047 
(0.54) 
Professional associations 
    
0.018 
(0.54) 
0.251 
(1.45) 
0.105 
(1.10) 
-0057 
(-0.61) 
Rating agencies 
    
0.064** 
(2.17) 
0.120 
(0.90) 
0.305*** 
(3.70) 
0.065 
(0.92) 
Consumers’ associations 
    
0.050** 
(2.02) 
0.060 
(0.48) 
0.057 
(0.76) 
0.083 
(1.25) 
Science 
    
0.093*** 
(3.13) 
0.203 
(1.43) 
0.228*** 
(2.70) 
-0.060 
(-0.86) 
Specialist publications 
    
0.157*** 
(2.99) 
-0.154 
(-0.67) 
0.345*** 
(2.62) 
0.101 
(-0.90) 
General media 
    
-0.040 
(-1.43) 
-0.145 
(-0.10) 
-0.093 
(-1.29) 
-0.006 
(-0.08) 
Source_further training  
    
-0.079* 
(-1.72) 
0.258 
(-1.23) 
-0.281** 
(-2.26) 
-0.219** 
(-1.96) 
Information content 
     
 
  
General Aspects 
     
0.378*** 
(3.68)  
0.025 
(0.48) 
Calculation of participation rates 
     
0.107 
(1.09) 
 
0.110** 
(2.18) 
Contract design 
     
-0.075 
(-0.72)  
-0.042 
(-0.84) 
Personal risk profile and security options  
     
0.336*** 
(3.02)  
0.155*** 
(2.94) 
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Table 1:  Regression Results (cont.) 
 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
OLS 
Model 3 
OLS 
Model 4 
OLS 
Model 5 
OLS 
Model 6 
OLS 
Model 7 
OLS 
Modell 8 
OLS 
Policy design 
     
-0.030 
(-0.28)  
0.002 
(0.04) 
Private old-age insurance products 
     
-0.076 
(-0.74)  
0.043 
(0.83) 
Contract Execution 
     
-0.033 
(-0.35)  
0.023 
(0.47) 
Rsquare 0.149 0.097 0.064 0.172 0.229 0.172 0.183 0.197 
Adj. Rsquare 0.133 0.082 0.048 0.155 0.194 0.121 0.146 0.142 
F-Test 10.46*** 0.096** 3.49*** 9.48*** 7.30*** 3.29*** 4.79*** 4.30*** 
Power test (α=0.001) 1.000 1.000 0.847 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
*** significant at the 1%- level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
t-values in parentheses 
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Table 2:  Regression Results 
a
 Dependent variable: log (contract conclusion rate/(1-contract conclusion rate)) 
 Model 9 
OLS 
Model 10 
OLS 
Model 11 
OLS 
Model 12 
OLS 
 N = 574 N = 543 N = 579 N = 495 
Dependent Variables Information 
Index 
Additional 
Services 
Service 
Index 
Contract  
conclusion rate a 
Constant 
1.332** 
(2.20) 
10.873*** 
(3.98) 
8.696*** 
(5.69) 
4.614*** 
(3.10) 
Independent Variables 
    
Intermediary type 
    
Exclusive agent -0.253*** 
(-3.37) 
0.996*** 
(2.93) 
-0.085 
(-0.37) 
-0.447** 
(-2.19) 
Firm size 
    
Small (1 to 3 employees) 0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.761*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.191 
(-1.44) 
0.093 
(0.88) 
Large (more then 9 employees) -0.111* 
(-1.57) 
0.073 
(0.18) 
-0.262 
(-1.04) 
0.209 
(1.06) 
Specialization 
    
Insurance company 0.022 
(0.31) 
0.159 
(-0.51) 
0.055 
(0.25) 
-0.089 
(-0.48) 
Insurance company reputation 0.041** 
(1.95) 
-0.271*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.034 
(-0.57) 
0.010 
(0.21) 
Insurance line -0.001 
(-0.00) 
0.511*** 
(2.76) 
0.135 
(1.12) 
-0.013 
(-0.14) 
Customer Segment 0.060 
(1.44) 
-0.104 
(-0.54) 
0.140 
(1.15) 
-0.032 
(-0.33) 
Additional Services  
0.147** 
(2.54)   
0.234** 
(1.81) 
Competitive pressure 0.007 
(0.31) 
-0.116 
(-1.15) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
-0.314*** 
(-5.66) 
Customers’ knowledge 
    
Risk profile 0.058** 
(1.96) 
0.017 
(0.13) 
0.178** 
(2.00) 
0.039 
(0.50) 
Old-age protection provisions -0.065** 
(-1.95) 
0.235* 
(1.16) 
-0.134 
(-1.46) 
0.041 
(0.49) 
(Dis-) Advantages of insurance products 0.023 
(0.79) 
-0.288** 
(-1.98) 
-0.094 
(-1.13) 
-0.096 
(-1.30) 
Customers’ demand 
    
Information provision 0.078** 
(2.43) 
-0.260** 
(-1.79) 
0.053 
(0.58) 
-0.026 
(-0.33) 
Additional services for free 0.061** 
(2.40) 
0.215** 
(1.88) 
0.221*** 
(3.09) 
-0.023 
(-0.38) 
Age 0.080 
(0.52) 
-1.433** 
(-2.04) 
-0.696* 
(-1.63) 
-0.867** 
(-2.22) 
Formal education 
    
Lower secondary school 0.088 
(1.05) 
0.163 
(0.46) 
-0.199 
(0.90) 
-0.013 
(-0.08) 
Intermediate leaving certificate 0.023 
(0.42) 
-0.065 
(-0.25) 
0.050 
(0.33) 
0.069 
(0.53) 
Certificate of aptitude for specialized short 
course in higher education 
0.042 
(0.73) 
-0.311 
(-1.07) 
-0.045 
(-0.26) 
0.227 
(1.59) 
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Table 2:  Regression Results (cont.) 
 Model 9 
OLS 
Model 10 
OLS 
Model 11 
OLS 
Model 12 
OLS 
(Additional) Training 
0.018 
(0.26) 
0.072 
(0.22) 
-0.041 
(-0.20) 
-0.199 
(-1.10) 
University degree -0.009 
(-0.18) 
0.240 
(0.90) 
0.065 
(0.39) 
-0.086 
(-0.61) 
Work experience -0.013 
(-0.23) 
0.062 
(0.23) 
0.025 
(0.16) 
0.167 
(1.12) 
Further training_number -0.034 
(-1.04) 
0.452*** 
(3.14) 
0.047 
(0.50) 
-0.120 
(-1.55) 
Time budget 
    
Information acquisition and processing 0.013 
(0.08) 
-0.545 
(-0.65) 
-0.726 
(-1.38) 
-0.797* 
(-1.78) 
Counseling interviews 0.259** 
(1.90) 
-0.342 
(-0.53) 
0.444 
(1.12) 
0.210 
(0.62) 
Further training 0.614** 
(1.92) 
2.434 
(1.54) 
2.375** 
(2.43) 
0.209 
(0.29) 
Claims settlement 0.512** 
(1.93) 
-0.483 
(-0.36) 
0.360 
(0.47) 
-1.325** 
(-2.01) 
Sales efforts -0.284 
(-0.70) 
1.149 
(0.65) 
0.315 
(0.30) 
-2.199** 
(-2.13) 
Duration_interviews 0.077** 
(2.18) 
0.152 
(0.81) 
0.378*** 
(3.46) 
0.235** 
(2.56) 
Information source 
    
Insurance companies 0.027 
(0.76) 
-0.044 
(-0.25) 
0.109 
(0.99) 
0.095 
(1.09) 
Professional associations 0.038 
(1.04) 
0.211 
(1.18) 
0.129 
(1.25) 
-0.148 
(-1.56) 
Rating agencies 0.046 
(1.46) 
0.094 
(0.68) 
0.253*** 
(2.75) 
0.043 
(0.60) 
Consumers’ associations 0.044** 
(1.76) 
0.121 
(0.95) 
0.101 
(1.31) 
0.062 
(0.99) 
Science 0.092*** 
(2.84) 
0.166 
(1.15) 
0.231** 
(2.50) 
-0.046 
(-0.66) 
Specialist publications 0.152*** 
(2.79) 
-0.312 
(-1.36) 
0.350** 
(2.43) 
-0.086 
(-0.73) 
General media -0.027 
(-0.99) 
-0.077 
(-0.58) 
-0.075 
(-0.93) 
0.010 
(0.13) 
Source_further training  -0.076* 
(-1.59) 
-0.211 
(-0.97) 
-0.276** 
(-2.08) 
-0.096 
(-0.86) 
Information content 
    
General Aspects 
 
0.302*** 
(2.85)  
0.025 
(0.46) 
Calculation of participation rates 
 
0.098 
(1.01)  
0.031 
(0.64) 
Contract design 
 
0.023 
(0.23) 
 
-0.052 
(-0.99) 
Personal risk profile and security options  
 
0.346*** 
(3.19)  
0.226*** 
(4.05) 
Policy design 
 
-0.047 
(-0.42)  
-0.012 
(-0.21) 
Private old-age insurance products 
 
-0.025 
(-0.24) 
 
0.086* 
(1.61) 
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Table 2:  Regression Results (cont.) 
 Model 9 
OLS 
Model 10 
OLS 
Model 11 
OLS 
Model 12 
OLS 
Contract Execution 
 
0.014 
(0.15)  
0.052 
(1.03) 
Rsquare 0.252 0.228 0.195 0.282 
Adj. Rsquare 0.202 0.163 0.143 0.214 
F-Test 5.86*** 3.86*** 3.84*** 4.84*** 
Power test (α=0.001) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Hypotheses  
 
 
Hypotheses Independent Variable Expected Sign of  Coefficient Estimates 
H 1: Product Quality Hypothesis 
Independent intermediaries provide better service 
quality. 
exclusive agent 
insurance company reputation 
consumers’ knowledge 
- 
+ 
+ 
H 2: Specialization, Economies of Scale and Scope 
Specialization and economies of scale and scope lead 
to better service quality. 
firm size 
insurance company  
insurance line 
customer segment 
additional services 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
H 3: Efforts spend  
The more an intermediary invests in general and 
insurance-specific human capital (knowledge and 
skills) and the more time an intermediary spends on 
information processing and counseling interviews, the 
better the service quality provided. 
 
 
formal education 
(additional) training 
university degree 
work experience 
further training 
time budget: 
information processing 
counselling interviews 
further training 
claims settlement 
sales efforts 
duration_interviews 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
H 4: Informational Input  
The better the information sources used by an 
intermediary are, the more information about relevant 
subjects an intermediary provides in counseling 
interviews and the more consumers’ cooperate, the 
better is the service quality provided. 
information source 
information content 
customers’ knowledge 
customers’ demand 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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Table A.2:  Definition and Measurement of Variables 
 Variable Explanation and Measurement 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
Information index Continuous variable measuring the mean value of 27 items26 about the 
importance attached to different aspects in counseling interviews by the 
intermediary ranging from  
1 = very  low quality ... 5 = very high quality 
 
Additional services Continuous variable measuring the number of additional services provided 
 
Service index Continuous variable measuring the total services quality. It is the additive 
aggregation of the normalized variables information index and additional 
services, with the information index entering with double weight. 
 
Contract conclusion 
rate 
Continuous variable measuring the proportion of the average number of 
counseling interviews on all interviews that lead to contract conclusion 
 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Distribution 
Channel 
Variable 
Intermediary type Set of dummy variables with 1 = intermediary type, 0 = other:  
exclusive agent; independent intermediary 
reference class: independent intermediary 
Specialization 
Variables 
Firm size Dummy variable measuring the size of an intermediary’s firm with 1 = yes, 
0 = no 
Small (1-3 employees), medium (4-9 employees), large (10-30 employees) 
reference class: medium (4-9 employees) 
 Insurance company  Dummy variable on specialization on a certain insurance company and its 
products with  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
 Insurance company 
reputation 
Continuous variable measuring the factor score extracted by a factor 
analyses which indicate how much weight intermediaries attach to the 
quality of the insurance company and the quality of the products they 
distribute for gaining reputation  
 Insurance line Dummy variable on specialization in old-age insurance products with  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
 Customer segment Dummy variable on specialization on customer segments with  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
                                                 
26
  For the single items see Table A.4 below. 
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Table A.2:  Definition and Measurement of Variables (cont.) 
 Variable Explanation and Measurement 
Human 
Capital 
Variables 
Age Continuous variable measuring the age of the interviewed intermediary in 
years 
 
Formal education Set of dummy variables with 1 = highest degree of formal education, 0 = 
other: 
lower secondary school; intermediate leaving certificate; certificate of 
aptitude for  specialized short-course higher education; general certificate 
of aptitude for higher education  
reference class: general certificate of aptitude for higher education  
 
(Additional) Training Dummy variable with 1 = (additional) training, 0 = none 
 University degree Dummy variable with 1 = university degree, 0 = none 
 Work experience Continuous variable measuring work experience in years 
 Further 
training_number 
Continuous variable measuring the number of further training courses, 
conferences etc. frequented during the last 12 months  
Information 
Production 
Variables 
Time budget 5 continuous variables measuring the share of the time spent for a certain 
activity on the total time budget:  
information acquisition and processing; counseling interviews; further 
training; claims settlement; sales efforts 
 Duration_interviews Continuous variable measuring the average duration of general counseling 
interviews in minutes 
 Information source 7 continuous variables measuring the importance of an information source 
used by an intermediary with its attached objectivity on a  
25-point rating scale with 1 = very subjective  and not at all important 
source … 25 = very credible and very important source: 
insurance companies; professional associations; rating agencies; 
consumers’ associations; science; specialist publications; general media  
 Source_further 
training 
Ordinal variable measuring the importance attached to further training as 
an information source measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 = not 
at all important … 5 = very important  
 
Information content 7 continuous variables measuring the factor scores extracted by a factor 
analysis from 27 items which indicate the importance attached to different 
aspects in counseling interviews by the intermediary:27 
old-age security in general; calculation of participation rates; contract 
design; personal risk profile and needs; policy design; private old-age 
insurance products; contract execution 
 Additional services Continuous variable measuring the number of additional services provided 
 
                                                 
27
  For more details see Tables A.4 and  A.5 below. 
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Table A.2:  Definition and Measurement of Variables (cont.) 
 Variable Explanation and Measurement 
Customer 
Variables 
Customers’ knowledge 3 ordinal variables indicating customers’ knowledge on a five-point Likert 
scale with 1 = very bad knowledge … 5 =  very good knowledge: 
risk profile; old-age protection provisions; (dis-)advantages of insurance 
products 
 Customers’ demand 2 ordinal variables measuring consumers’ demand on a five-point Likert 
scale with 1 = more modest … 5 = more demanding about: 
information services; additional services for free 
Market 
Variable 
Competitive pressure Ordinary variable measuring the extent of competitive pressure on a five-
point Likert scale with 1 = none … 5 = very strong 
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Table A.3:  Descriptive Statistics  
Dependent Variables Min Max Mean Median StandDev N 
Information Index 1.407 5.000 3.716 3.703 0.531 917 
Information Index Dummy 0.000 1.000 0.523 1.000 0.499 938 
Contract Conclusion Rate -2.944 4.595 0.743 0.847 1.195 830 
Additional Services 0.000 15.000 6.650 7.000 2.333 927 
Service Index 
 
6.000 15.000 11.330 11.000 1.484 912 
Independent Variables       
Intermediary type       
Exclusive agent 0.000 1.000 0.452 0.000 0.497 933 
Firm size       
Small (1 to 3 employees) 0.000 1.000 0.642 1.000 0.479 910 
Medium (3 to 9 employees) 0.000 1.000 0.280 0.000 0.449 910 
Large (more then 9 employees) 0.000 1.000 0.076 0.000 0.266 910 
Specialization       
Insurance company 0.000 1.000 0.605 1.000 0.489 915 
Insurance company reputation 
-3.838 2.783 0.000 0.076 1.000 864 
Insurance line 0.000 1.000 0.384 0.000 0.486 938 
Customer Segment 0.000 1.000 0.567 1.000 0.496 938 
Age 20.000 64.000 43.102 42.000 8.966 929 
Formal education       
Lower secondary school 0.000 1.000 0.118 0.000 0.323 935 
Intermediate leaving certificate 0.000 1.000 0.376 0.000 0.484 935 
Certificate of aptitude for 
specialized short-course in higher 
education 
0.000 1.000 0.186 0.000 0.389 935 
(Additional) Training 0.000 1.000 0.915 1.000 0.278 933 
University degree 0.000 1.000 0.266 0.000 0.442 905 
Work experience 1.000 48.000 16.059 14.000 8.324 928 
Further training_number       
Time budget       
Information acquisition and 
processing 
0.000 0.700 0.212 0.200 0.124 866 
Counseling interviews 0.000 0.900 0.368 0.350 0.157 867 
Further training 0.000 0.500 0.115 0.100 0.066 867 
Claims settlement 0.000 0.500 0.111 0.100 0.076 866 
Sales efforts 0.000 0.700 0.061 0.050 0.057 867 
Duration_interviews 10.000 180.000 56.710 60.000 31.314 884 
Information source       
Insurance companies 1.000 25.000 11.064 10.000 5.745 906 
Professional associations 1.000 25.000 12.090 12.000 5.735 866 
Rating agencies 1.000 25.000 11.295 12.000 6.257 861 
Consumers’ associations 1.000 25.000 8.109 8.000 5.412 861 
Science 1.000 25.000 9.244 9.000 5.534 821 
Specialist publications 1.000 25.000 13.830 13.500 5.489 896 
General media 1.000 25.000 6.668 6.000 4.485 873 
Source_further training  1.000 5.000 2.340 2.000 1.095 898 
Information content       
General aspects 
-4.126 2.489 0.000 0.105 1.000 828 
Calculation of participation rates 
-3.543 2.853 0.000 0.092 1.000 828 
Contract design 
-2.811 4.293 0.000 0.043 1.000 828 
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Table A.3:  Descriptive Statistics (cont.) 
Independent Variables Min Max Mean Median StandDev N 
Personal risk profile and security 
options  -5.875 2.804 0.000 0.089 1.000 828 
Policy design 
-3.706 2.305 0.000 0.036 1.000 828 
Private old-age insurance 
products -3.274 2.120 0.000 0.122 1.000 828 
Contract execution 
-3.272 3.013 0.000 0.094 1.000 828 
Customers’ demand       
Information provision 1.000 5.000 4.008 4.000 0.751 918 
Additional services for free 1.000 5.000 3.753 4.000 0.928 916 
Customers’ knowledge       
Risk profile 1.000 5.000 2.647 3.000 0.763 921 
Old-age protection provisions 1.000 5.000 2.749 3.000 0.747 919 
(Dis-) Advantages of insurance 
products 
1.000 5.000 2.326 2.000 0.862 920 
Competitive pressure 1.000 5.000 3.326 3.000 1.005 893 
 
  48 
Table A.4: Factor Analysis Information Content – Rotated Component Matrix 
 Components      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Variables General 
Aspects 
Calculation 
of 
Participation 
Rates 
Contract 
Design 
Personal 
Risk Profile 
and Security 
Options 
Policy 
Design 
Private  
Old-age 
Insurance 
Products 
Contract 
Execution 
Tax advantages .809       
Occupational pension 
schemes vs. private 
old-age insurance 
 
 
.708 
      
Taxation and social 
policy regulation 
 
.686 
      
Performance of 
insurance companies 
 
.525 
      
Investment funds .499       
Disadvantages of 
zillmering 
 
.417 
      
Surplus and interest 
rate changes 
  
.782 
     
Non commitment  .709      
Guaranteed 
performance 
  
.702 
     
Surplus determinants  .619      
Past effective surplus  .615      
Termination options   .845     
Contract period   .789     
Procedures of 
contract modification 
   
.658 
    
Costs of contract 
modification 
   
.585 
    
Type and coverage of 
the insured risks 
    
.725 
   
Individual security 
gaps 
    
.695 
   
Insurance and product 
types 
    
.609 
   
(Dis-) advantages of 
different security 
options 
    
 
.533 
   
Premium design     .778   
Price-performance 
tests 
     
.762 
  
Cost components     .593   
Capital sum life 
insurance vs. Riester 
policy 
      
 
.776 
 
Cost calculation by 
change of policy 
      
.774 
 
Specific rest life 
insurance vs. capital 
sum life insurance 
      
 
.606 
 
Claim settlement       .710 
Conflict settlement       .602 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser-normalization. 
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Table A.5:  Factor Analysis Information Content – Sampling Adequacy and Total Variance  
                    Explained 
Measure of sampling adequacy by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics   0.889 
Total variance explained 
 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Component Total % of Variance 
Cumula-
tive % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive % 
1 7.658 28.361 28.361 7.658 28.361 28.361 2.876 10.654 10.654
2 1.884 6.976 35.337 1.884 6.976 35.337 2.758 10.215 20.868
3 1.754 6.496 41.834 1.754 6.496 41.834 2.652 9.823 30.691
4 1.513 5.605 47.439 1.513 5.605 47.439 2.374 8.792 39.483
5 1.415 5.242 52.681 1.415 5.242 52.681 2.209 8.181 47.664
6 1.252 4.638 57.319 1.252 4.638 57.319 2.004 7.421 55.085
7 1.076 3.985 61.304 1.076 3.985 61.304 1.679 6.219 61.304
8 .795 2.944 64.248
9 .781 2.891 67.139
10 .754 2.791 69.930
11 .729 2.702 72.632
12 .697 2.580 75.212
13 .648 2.399 77.611
14 .620 2.297 79.909
15 .573 2.121 82.029
16 .549 2.034 84.064
17 .505 1.870 85.934
18 .491 1.817 87.751
19 .459 1.700 89.451
20 .430 1.593 91.044
21 .420 1.558 92.601
22 .397 1.470 94.072
23 .373 1.370 95.451
24 .350 1.298 96.749
25 .319 1.180 97.930
26 .301 1.116 99.046
27 .258 .954 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table A.6:  Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
1 Age 1,00
2 Formal education-lower secondary school 0,18 1,00
3 Formal education-intermediate leaving certificate 0,05 -0,24 1,00
4 Formal education-certificate of aptitude for specialized short-course higher education0,04 -0,17 -0,37 1,00
5 (Additional) Training -0,07 -0,03 0,18 0,03 1,00
6 University degree -0,01 -0,20 -0,31 0,03 -0,27 1,00
7 Work experience 0,68 0,24 0,13 -0,02 0,01 -0,19 1,00
8 Time budget:information acquisition and processing-0,03 0,07 -0,03 -0,01 -0,06 0,01 -0,06 1,00
9 Time budget:counseling interviews 0,05 0,04 0,06 -0,01 0,04 -0,01 0,01 -0,27 1,00
10 Time budget:further training 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,11 -0,03 0,05 0,08 -0,11 1,00
11 Time budget:claims settlement 0,00 0,08 -0,04 0,07 0,03 -0,06 0,06 -0,15 -0,06 0,01 1,00
12 Time budget:sales efforts -0,09 -0,09 0,12 -0,08 0,07 -0,03 -0,06 -0,06 -0,10 -0,07 0,01 1,00
13 Duration_interviews -0,06 -0,02 -0,12 0,07 -0,09 0,10 -0,08 -0,04 -0,11 0,08 -0,08 -0,08 1,00
14 Exclusive agent 0,02 0,05 0,07 -0,04 0,03 -0,06 0,02 -0,24 0,13 -0,14 0,03 -0,02 -0,16 1,00
15 Information source: insurance companies 0,12 0,08 0,00 -0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,11 -0,08 0,05 -0,05 0,03 -0,02 -0,15 0,19 1,00
16 Information source: professional associations 0,06 0,08 0,05 -0,07 -0,01 -0,05 0,11 0,01 -0,06 0,06 0,04 -0,11 -0,09 0,00 0,11 1,00
17 Information source: rating agencies -0,21 -0,09 -0,09 0,06 0,06 -0,04 -0,13 0,08 -0,04 0,12 -0,05 0,03 0,06 -0,23 -0,11 0,18 1,00
18 Information source: consumers’ associations 0,04 -0,10 -0,06 0,04 -0,08 0,05 -0,06 -0,02 0,11 0,08 -0,01 0,02 0,08 -0,08 -0,15 0,11 0,29 1,00
19 Information source: science 0,03 -0,08 0,02 0,06 -0,11 0,11 -0,01 0,09 0,00 0,15 0,00 -0,10 0,17 -0,15 -0,14 0,03 0,14 0,32 1,00
20 Information source: specialist publications 0,02 -0,01 0,06 -0,07 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,06 -0,03 0,08 0,01 0,12 0,03 -0,08 -0,10 0,13 0,06 0,20 0,30 1,00
21 Information source: general media -0,03 -0,05 0,02 -0,04 0,02 0,00 -0,06 -0,09 0,08 0,07 0,04 0,09 0,00 -0,07 -0,08 -0,13 -0,06 0,30 0,17 0,28 1,00
22 Source_further training -0,03 -0,07 -0,13 0,02 -0,05 0,12 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,09 0,00 0,09 -0,03 -0,10 -0,12 -0,15 0,09 0,09 -0,05 -0,12 0,07 1,00
23 Customers’ knowledge: risk profile -0,13 0,02 -0,16 -0,01 -0,05 0,07 -0,15 0,08 -0,10 0,06 0,05 0,02 0,05 -0,09 0,13 -0,09 0,07 -0,01 0,04 -0,05 0,10 0,04 1,00
24 Customers’ knowledge: old-age protection provisions+B440,03 -0,02 -0,03 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,04 -0,03 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,06 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,06 0,12 0,06 0,04 0,12 0,05 0,41 1,00
25 Customers’ knowledge:(dis-)advantages of insurance products-0,08 -0,04 -0,11 0,02 0,01 0,06 -0,10 -0,02 -0,02 0,07 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,00 0,09 -0,06 0,06 0,08 0,14 0,01 0,15 0,02 0,44 0,53 1,00
26 Firm size: small 0,11 0,06 -0,05 0,00 0,02 -0,04 -0,04 0,00 0,09 0,02 -0,05 -0,08 0,00 0,11 0,01 0,03 0,07 0,20 -0,05 -0,02 0,11 -0,01 0,01 0,05 0,01 1,00
27 Firm size: large  -0,12 -0,09 -0,04 -0,11 -0,02 0,15 -0,02 -0,05 0,01 -0,04 0,00 0,06 0,00 -0,13 0,04 0,02 0,06 -0,01 -0,01 0,04 -0,04 -0,04 0,05 -0,03 0,01 -0,40 1,00
28 Customer segment -0,08 -0,09 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,05 0,04 -0,12 0,11 -0,08 0,00 0,10 -0,15 -0,05 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,01 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,03 -0,04 0,16 1,00
29 Additional services -0,20 -0,07 0,01 -0,01 0,06 0,06 -0,06 -0,08 0,01 0,18 -0,01 0,06 0,13 0,04 -0,01 0,08 0,08 0,01 0,07 -0,01 -0,10 -0,15 0,01 0,05 0,00 -0,17 0,09 0,03 1,00
30 Insurance company -0,02 0,03 0,07 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 0,01 0,05 -0,02 -0,03 -0,02 0,05 0,00 -0,16 -0,03 0,01 -0,02 -0,06 -0,02 0,06 -0,10 -0,01 -0,04 -0,08 -0,13 -0,08 0,03 0,06 0,09 1,00
31 Insurance line 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 0,02 -0,05 0,03 -0,07 0,14 0,11 -0,12 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,08 -0,03 0,12 -0,02 0,04 -0,03 0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,06 0,03 0,05 -0,03 -0,03 0,12 0,00 1,00
32 Customers’ demand: information services -0,08 -0,01 0,03 -0,03 -0,02 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,03 -0,03 -0,02 -0,05 0,03 0,08 0,11 0,20 0,15 0,04 0,11 0,09 0,09 -0,07 0,12 0,20 0,19 -0,03 0,07 0,01 0,04 -0,09 0,01 1,00
33 Customers’ demand: additional services for free -0,04 -0,04 0,05 0,04 0,09 -0,04 0,02 -0,05 0,03 0,06 0,03 0,06 0,01 0,08 0,12 0,15 0,05 0,02 0,06 0,10 0,03 -0,15 0,05 0,12 0,08 -0,03 0,09 -0,06 0,16 0,00 0,07 0,41 1,00
34 Competitive pressure 0,04 -0,02 0,05 0,05 0,04 -0,03 0,09 -0,01 -0,04 -0,14 -0,03 0,21 -0,06 0,16 0,11 0,02 -0,06 -0,11 -0,15 0,11 0,04 -0,03 -0,01 -0,04 -0,07 -0,02 0,06 -0,08 -0,05 0,02 -0,02 0,12 0,17 1,00
35 Insurance company reputation 0,05 0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,04 -0,01 0,04 0,05 0,01 -0,01 0,04 0,05 0,03 -0,03 0,19 0,07 0,10 0,01 0,09 0,11 0,02 -0,07 -0,04 -0,01 -0,05 -0,08 0,00 0,03 -0,03 0,07 0,04 0,12 0,16 0,09 1,00
36 Information content:old-age security in general -0,14 -0,02 0,01 0,04 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,05 -0,06 0,12 -0,07 -0,05 0,18 -0,20 -0,05 0,14 0,09 0,01 0,11 0,12 -0,03 -0,04 -0,01 0,03 -0,02 -0,10 0,09 0,20 0,19 -0,11 0,04 0,10 0,14 -0,10 0,04 1,00
37 Information content:calculation of participation rates0,07 -0,08 0,00 0,09 0,04 0,00 0,03 -0,03 0,08 0,00 -0,02 -0,07 0,06 -0,06 -0,01 0,12 0,09 0,12 0,17 0,06 0,09 -0,01 -0,06 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,02 -0,02 0,12 0,06 -0,03 0,13 -0,01 1,00
38 Information content: contract design 0,00 -0,03 -0,03 -0,01 -0,05 0,00 -0,16 0,04 -0,03 0,12 -0,04 0,01 0,08 -0,11 0,06 -0,08 0,12 0,08 0,18 0,01 0,02 -0,05 0,03 -0,03 0,09 0,15 -0,20 0,02 0,11 0,13 0,08 -0,09 0,05 -0,04 0,02 0,02 0,04 1,00
39 Information content:personal risk profile and needs-0,09 -0,08 0,03 -0,03 -0,05 0,05 0,01 -0,18 0,06 -0,03 0,06 -0,03 0,14 0,09 0,10 0,13 0,08 -0,01 0,00 0,27 -0,05 -0,12 -0,11 -0,14 -0,17 -0,07 0,04 -0,04 0,13 0,01 -0,01 0,19 0,11 0,20 0,14 0,16 0,04 -0,01 1,00
40 Information content:policy design -0,01 0,11 -0,12 0,14 -0,02 0,04 0,00 0,08 -0,01 0,04 0,06 0,03 0,07 -0,27 -0,10 0,03 0,12 0,15 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,01 0,17 0,05 0,07 -0,06 0,15 -0,01 -0,04 0,06 -0,08 0,01 0,02 -0,08 0,06 -0,14 0,03 -0,09 0,01 1,00
41 Information content:private old-age insurance products0,12 0,05 0,04 0,01 0,07 -0,08 0,08 0,00 0,10 -0,02 0,05 -0,02 -0,06 -0,02 -0,01 0,14 -0,06 0,12 0,03 0,02 -0,03 0,07 -0,04 -0,09 -0,06 0,13 -0,05 -0,08 -0,10 -0,10 0,03 0,06 0,02 0,03 -0,04 -0,03 0,03 -0,09 0,02 0,00 1,00
42 Information content:contract execution 0,06 0,09 -0,04 0,10 0,05 -0,06 0,07 0,02 0,00 0,05 0,18 0,00 -0,02 0,12 0,13 0,09 -0,08 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,09 -0,02 0,06 0,09 0,11 0,03 -0,10 0,05 0,01 -0,04 -0,04 -0,02 0,03 -0,06 0,07 0,11 -0,01 -0,05 -0,07 0,06 -0,02 1,00
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